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November 15, 2013

#Gold`s inexorable move east - a #chart says it all

this flow can also be marked in the volume of the metal being converted from London Good Delivery bar-form into smaller, 'Asian consumer-friendly denominations of kilo-bars and below...
Further proof of the yellow metal's journey east comes in the form of a graph from the World Gold Council.

Chart demonstrating gold's inexorable move east

GOLD NEWS

Author: Geoff Candy
Posted: Thursday , 14 Nov 2013 
GRONINGEN (MINEWEB) - 
The graph below is from The World Gold Council's latest Gold Demand Trends report and is appropriately titled West to east.
The Council makes the point in its commentary that this flow can also be marked in the volume of the metal being converted from London Good Delivery bar-form into smaller, 'Asian consumer-friendly denominations of kilo-bars and below'.
According to the WGC, "Eurostat show exports of gold from the UK to Switzerland for the January – August period grew more than tenfold, to 1,016.3t.1 This compares with a total of just 85.1t for the same period in 2012."
This trend is something Mineweb has watched with interest over recent years; the graph below is just further proof of just how sharply the move is happening.

October 30, 2013

It's official, #OGX Files for #Bankruptcy: total debt $5.1 bn @NYTimes

the company’s total debt is 11.2 billion reais, or $5.1 billion, making this filing the largest corporate default in the history of Latin America.

It's official, OGX Files for Bankruptcy

NY Times
Eike Batista with President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil last year.Ricardo Moraes/Reuters Eike Batista with President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil last year.

Updated, 3:37 p.m. | SÃO PAULO, Brazil — The flagship company of the Brazilian entrepreneur Eike Batista, the petroleum company OGX, filed for bankruptcy on Wednesday via a court-supervised restructuring.
The filing was a stunning fall for Mr. Batista, who was once a symbol of Brazil’s rapid rise as a global economic power. The move became nearly certain after OGX missed a $45 million bond payment on Oct. 1. As of that date, OGX had 30 days to negotiate with creditors.
According to papers filed with the Court of Justice of Rio de Janeiro, the company’s total debt is 11.2 billion reais, or $5.1 billion, making this filing the largest corporate default in the history of Latin America.
The company owes $3.6 billion to bondholders, most of whom are foreign, with the rest of the debt to suppliers and banks.
Pimco, the world’s largest bond investor, and BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, both invested in OGX and stand to lose from any bankruptcy filing.
Even after a filing, the process could be long and tortuous. Of the approximately 4,000 companies that have entered court-supervised restructuring since the procedure was established in Brazil in 2005, only about 1 percent have successfully left the bankruptcy court’s supervision, according to a study by the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo.
Only 23 percent even managed the first step, which is to have a creditors’ assembly approve the restructuring plan. Many cases are fought over in Brazil’s notoriously slow justice system, where appeals can drag on for years.
Márcio Costa, a partner in the Rio de Janeiro law firm Sérgio Bermudes, which handled the bankruptcy filing, said on Wednesday that “OGX has high debts, but restructured, the assets are sufficient for the company to be viable.” He added that he was “optimistic” that negotiations with creditors would be successful.
OGX has pursued many active discussions to try to stave off bankruptcy. Rumors have swirled about possible new investors in the company, especially after the firm dismissed its chief executive officer and chief legal counsel on Oct. 15.
OGX confirmed on Oct. 17 that it was talking to the Brazilian investment firm Vinci Partners and other firms about restructuring options, but no deal has yet been reached.
Its sister company OSX, whose primary business is building ships and marine architecture for OGX’s petroleum exploration operations, said this week in a note that it did not expect to seek a bankruptcy court’s protection “at this moment.” OSX’s debts were listed in its balance sheet at $2.4 billion at the end of the second quarter, and it, too, has little cash flow. But unlike its sister company, OSX has easily marketable assets including oil rigs, and most of its short-term debts are with government-controlled banks that have already agreed to reschedule some payments.
Brazilian bankruptcy courts almost always approve a company’s initial request for protection, said Thomas Felsberg, a bankruptcy lawyer in São Paulo, as long as the documents are in order and such approval does not contain any judgment about a company’s chances of emerging from bankruptcy.
If the request is approved, the company has a 180-day stay period in which it is protected from creditors’ demands.
Documents released on Tuesday on OGX’s website indicate that the company will run out of cash in December and needs $250 million to continue operations through April 2014.
These funds could come from selling its natural gas subsidiary OGX Maranhão, and from a possible investment by the Malaysian petroleum company Petronas in one of OGX’s offshore petroleum blocks, the company’s documents said.
The bankruptcy filing concluded with the statement that OGX had reached an agreement to sell its share in OGX Maranhão, though no details were given.
Mr. Batista won international fame for his plans to build an empire of energy, mining, and logistics companies. For several years, OGX announced one petroleum find after another, and the share prices of all six of his publicly traded companies soared on the São Paulo stock exchange. But none of the companies managed to become profitable in time to service their billions in debt.
Mr. Batista’s personal worth, which at one point last year exceeded $30 billion, is now estimated at well under $1 billion. Minority shareholders in OGX are suing both the company and Mr. Batista for what may have been misleading statements about OGX’s supposed petroleum finds and for possible instances of insider trading.
Brazil’s securities regulator, known as the CVM, announced in September that it was investigating Mr. Batista and other senior managers of OGX for possible violations of disclosure rules.
Marcus Sequeira, Latin America petroleum analyst for Deutsche Bank, said that it was clear several years ago that OGX was not going to be as successful as hoped.
The company issued in April 2011 a report in which it claimed more than 10 billion barrels in reserves. But to reach that number the company added together different kinds of reserves, most merely possible rather than confirmed or even probable.
Although this discrepancy was in the 2011 report for anyone to see, few paid attention to it, Mr. Sequeira said. “It is the same in every bubble,” he said. “At some point everyone only wants to hear the good news.”
Looking forward, Mr. Sequeira said he was “not optimistic” about OGX’s fate, because “the resource base is clearly not as big as the company was saying.”
But because there is some oil in OGX’s fields, Mr. Sequeira said it might be possible, if a new investor is found, for production to resume and bondholders to eventually get a portion of their money back, though shareholders would probably be wiped out.

Brazilian Energy Company OGX Files for Bankruptcy - NYTimes.com

October 29, 2013

To offset price declines #Mining groups are playing a mutually destructive game of output tonnage chicken

Whilst volume gains help to offset price declines, applied industry-wide they have the perverse effect of feeding lower prices. ... The current environment however is especially conducive to a supply glut caused by a mutually destructive game of output tonnage chicken.

From Mineweb.com

Diversifieds boxed in by past mistakes and Glasenberg's language

MINING FINANCE / INVESTMENT

The world's major diversified mining companies have been ratcheting up production and cutting exploration in a bid to combat falling costs, but it could come back to haunt them.
Author: Alex Williams
Posted: Tuesday , 29 Oct 2013 
LONDON (Mineweb) -
“Mining companies were producing copper for 80 cents a pound and selling it for 60 cents a pound,” one speaker at an Australian small-cap conference quipped last week, “but they all tried to make it up in volume.”
Record volumes, particularly in iron ore, have been the mainstay of this month's reporting season. BHP's output from Western Australia jumped 23 per cent year-on-year to 48.8m tonnes, with Rio Tinto also hitting new production highs on delivery of its so-called 290 rail-port expansion in the Pilbara.
Bumper volumes were not confined to Australian iron ore. BHP reported record output in petroleum and from its coal divisions in Colombia and New South Wales, whilst Rio broke records in bauxite and thermal coal. Aided by its Oyu Tolgoi goliath in Mongolia, its share in mined copper meanwhile leapt from 132,00 to 162,000 tonnes, whilst Anglo American cranked up copper volumes by 32 per cent, driven by its Los Bronces mine in Chile.
Most bullishly, majors are “making hay while the sun still shines.” In its last full year, Anglo American made net profit margins of 18 per cent in copper. Prices have since come off by 38 cents per lb, leaving Anglo with all-in copper margins of around 10 per cent, even before any cost improvement. As margins go, they're up there with sportswear and fizzy drinks, if not wholesale lingerie.
More sceptically, miners are cranking up output to defend earnings in the face of lower prices. Higher grades played their part in Anglo's output splurge at Los Bronces and likewise at Escondida, part-owned by Rio and BHP. In a soft price environment, the front-loading of ready tonnes and high grade ore inflates production, offsetting revenue declines whilst lowering unit costs. The result is less volatile earnings, but the tactic defers high cost production rather than lowering it, with the risk that it is rendered uneconomic.

Market Capacity

A secondary consequence of record output levels is an upset market balance. Chinese steel production and inventory restocking have buoyed iron ore prices in recent months to $135 per tonne, but the figure comes under renewed strain the quicker majors turn up volume.
By the end of the first half of 2014, Rio expects its Pilbara operations to be running at 290m tonnes per annum, a 7 per cent increase on current levels. The group's board has approved a further $5.9bn expansion to its throughput capacity in the region to 360m tonnes per annum. Even more threateningly, Brazil's Vale plans to produce 480m tonnes by 2018, versus 306m presently. Mid-tier producers are also in on the game, with Atlas and BC Iron both ratcheting up exports as quickly as their infrastructure allows them.
Whilst volume gains help to offset price declines, applied industry-wide they have the perverse effect of feeding lower prices. In their defence, since miners are price-takers, mining is only ever a volume game. The current environment however is especially conducive to a supply glut caused by a mutually destructive game of output tonnage chicken.

Glencore's Decoy

Record production figures are the direct consequence of a renewed focus by majors on the rhetoric of returns. Shareholder discontent at capital cost blow-outs and disastrous acquisitions, including Anglo's $8.8bn Minas-Rio project in Brazil and Rio Tinto's $38bn purchase of Alcan, has seen a raft of new chief executives instated, eager to distance themselves from the industry's reputation, tarnished in the eyes of investors.
Anglo's new chief executive Mark Cutifani is due to report a full business review in December, whilst BHP boss Andrew Mackenzie has promised a “laser-like focus” on costs. The cost-tough brownfield-obsessed mindset however has been led by Glencore's Ivan Glasenberg, who has routinely lambasted the industry for ploughing more capital into expansion than into shareholder returns. Glencore has dropped half the 88 projects it acquired with Xstrata, whilst closing two offices a week since the deal closed in May.
“We are not focused on replacing depleting assets,” Glasenberg has said. “If it does not make economic sense and does not give us a return on equity, we will not do it. If our company gets smaller so be it.” The attitude has been lauded by the market, with Bernstein analyst Paul Gait crediting Glasenberg with “genuine industry leadership.”
Ironically, Glencore is the only major to have sizeably increased its mining footprint in recent years. Besides its Xstrata deal, the largest transaction in the history of the mining industry, Glencore jointly paid $1bn for Rio Tinto's majority share in the Clermont coal mine in Queensland last week through a joint-venture with Japan's Sumitomo. It has meanwhile written $7.7bn off the value of its mining assets this year.
That the company is pursuing the opposite path to its rhetoric is incidental: by broadcasting the toughest line, Glasenberg has set the tone, with peers dashing off in pursuit. “Returns” or “return on” was used 12 times in Rio's most recent financial results, versus only once in the same report 3 years ago. Over the same period, Anglo American likewise bumped-up its use of the phrase from 2 to 6 times, whilst BHP held steady at 7. (Vale clearly uses a different PR company, having trended in the other direction.)
The dogma favours brownfield investment over green as previously burned fingers are reluctant to contemplate new acquisitions and exploration viewed as a straight-up expense. Rio Tinto is cutting $750m from its exploration budget this year, with 97 per cent of the savings achieved already, three months ahead of its year-end. BHP has been less granular in detailing cut-backs, but with the exception of copper in the Andes, is believed to have abolished spending on virgin exploration entirely.

LIMITED STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES

Unable to buy, explore or develop new projects, majors have been boxed into two strategic alternatives. One is to divest, though they must not be seen to do so at fire-sale prices. “This is not market day at the bazaar,” Rio's Sam Walsh has said. The result has been a constipated market, with private equity and mid-tier miners expecting distressed valuations, but majors wanting a dial-moving price.
As a case in point, Walsh has so far been unable to budge Rio's diamond business or its share in ASX-listed Coal & Allied. In the face of an asking price above $3.5bn, China's Minmetals is also reported to have dropped out of the bidding for its iron ore assets in Canada.
The last remaining option open to majors is to expand their existing operations, escalating near-term tonnage and cash flow. Higher incremental returns can be earned from sites where money has already been sunk, the thinking goes, than on new vanity projects, where returns are further out and therefore less certain.
Importantly, investing in existing assets is also less conspicuous for chief executives and therefore less risky than forging ahead into new ones. Rio's cap-ex pipeline in the Pilbara is a $20.6bn, with a further $1.4bn slated for its share of costs at Escondida, an obligation matched by BHP.
Investment once budgeted for exploration, acquisitions or development is instead being funnelled into near-term tonnage. Rather than staggering capital over a mine's full life-cycle, it is being ploughed into that with the quickest and most gaugeable return.
Advising miners to hold tonnes in the ground is as futile as telling consumers to stop driving up prices with buying. Majors must recognise however that at some point, their focus has to shift from their own capacity to that of the market's. It is a realisation unlikely to be acted upon until prices force their hand.


Diversifieds boxed in by past mistakes and Glasenberg`s language - MINING FINANCE / INVESTMENT - Mineweb.com Mineweb

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