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June 26, 2012

Mid-tier producers grapple with #Peru's growing pains | The Northern Miner #Mining

Mid-tier producers grapple with Peru's growing pains

By: Ian Bickis

VANCOUVER 2012-06-25
Peru is experiencing a mining boom of global proportions thanks to years of heavy investment and increasing production.

The country is the world’s number-two copper producer, number-two silver producer, number-six gold producer, number-two zinc producer and number-four lead producer, and it ranks high in other commodities, too. Exports, of which mining accounts for about 60%, have grown from $6 billion in the late 1990s to $46 billion in 2011.

That growth shows little sign of letting up, with $50 billion in investments lined up for mining projects, and much of the country remaining under-explored.

But the rapid growth is creating new challenges for companies large and small trying to open and operate mines in the country. On a social level there is growing discontent as to how the benefits of mining have been distributed, while on the operational side, the mining boom has brought with it the same kinds of labour shortages seen elsewhere in the mining world.

Rio Alto Mining (RIO-T) and Fortuna Silver Mines (FVI-T, FSM-N) are two of the few Canadian-listed companies that have transited from developer to producer in the country. Both have faced these issues, and through a variety of approaches have succeeded despite them, continuing to ramp up production and for the most part increase earnings.

Since restructuring in 2009 and listing on the Lima Stock Exchange, Rio Alto has commissioned its first gold mine, La Arena, in Peru’s northwest district of La Libertad. The company started pre-production at the oxide mine in May 2011, produced 56,000 oz. gold in the first quarter of 2012 and expects to produce around 155,000 oz. gold for the year. Meanwhile, the company’s stock price has gone from 7¢ in late 2008 to a recent 52-week high of $4.76, at a time most mining stocks have declined.

In the past six years Fortuna has gone from being a company with five employees to a mid-tier producer with two mines in operation and some 1,500 employees, including contractors. In the first quarter of 2012 the company produced 953,000 oz. silver, 5,100 oz. gold, 4.4 million lb. lead and 5.3 million lb. zinc from its Caylloma polymetallic mine in Peru’s southern region of Arequipa and its San Jose mine in Mexico. Since late 2008 the company’s stock price has gone from 38¢ to a high of $7.58 in late February.

But Fortuna’s stock price was hit hard at the end of March, dropping well below $4 for a stretch, after several issues came to light in its quarterly results. The news that most affected the company’s stock price were the higher costs it encountered in the quarter and its projections of 20% in cost inflation for 2012. According to Fortuna’s investor relations manager Carlos Baca, that cost increase can be blamed mostly on rising labour costs.

Peru, which had been isolated from the global labour crunch for some time thanks to its established talent pool, is now facing the same shortages as the rest of the industry.

Jorge Ganoza, president and CEO of Fortuna, said in a phone interview from Lima that he remembers hearing about skilled-worker shortages in Australia and South Africa a few years ago, but that it wasn’t affecting Fortuna’s operations.

“We were in Peru and Mexico at the time and we didn’t know what they were talking about. There were no shortages here. And then the shortages moved to North America — to the U.S. and Canada — and we were still immune to that. But now it’s ­happening to us,” Ganoza says.

Ganoza spots big career ads in the Lima newspapers from BHP, Rio Tinto and the other big multinationals hunting for skilled labour, often looking for workers for their operations abroad in ­Australia or Africa.

“Peru has become a pool for talent, and that of course is putting pressure on us here as well,” Ganoza says.

In response, Fortuna has implemented new compensation packages, but also moved to do things Ganoza has not seen in the past, like mapping talent in the company, determining key positions and issuing retention packages for key personnel. Without the vast resources of the majors, it can be harder to manage human resources, but Ganoza says that for the size of the company, Fortuna has been innovative in its efforts.

At Rio Alto, company president and CEO Alex Black said in a phone interview from Lima that the company has also seen labour costs increase, despite the country’s talent pool.

“We’re lucky because Peru is a mining country, so there is a lot of talent in-country. Having said that, we are seeing wage inflation in the mining sector because the country is growing and the mining sector is very lucrative.”

But Black says that Rio Alto is well placed to attract workers because Peru has an 8% profit sharing regime, and Rio Alto expects to be profitable in the coming years as it ramps up production.

“Workers will gain considerably from a successful operation,” Black notes. He also added that with Rio Alto’s La Arena mine sitting at a relatively manageable 3,500 metres, and within about 100 km of the coast and the city of Trujillo, it is more accessible and easier to attract workers than some of Peru’s more remote or high-latitude mines. And the company’s stock performance, helped by a stable Peruvian shareholder component, has given the company a higher profile that has also made attracting talent easier.

“It adds to our visibility and credibility. We’re not some junior company that just appeared. So that helps us attract people as well,” Black says.

But while the labour shortage creeps up in the background, social unrest is the glaring challenge to operating in Peru. The high-profile conflict surrounding Newmont Mining’s (NMC-T, NEM-N) $4.8-billion Conga copper-gold project is only the most visible of many simmering social conflicts affecting projects large and small across the country.

Both Rio Alto and Fortuna have experienced social unrest in the past year, though both incidents were fairly isolated. Rio Alto had around 30 locals blockade a road to its mine last September, and at the end of May the road to Fortuna’s Caylloma mine was blocked by a few hundred people in a 48-hour strike.

In Rio’s case, Black says the locals did not have particular demands and mostly sought clarification of agreements already made. The illegal blockade prevented 700 people from getting to work and disrupted operations at the mine, but the company took a patient approach.

“Instead of letting nature take its course and allowing the police to come in, we instigated dialogue to let them voice their objections to get the blockade over and done with,” Black says. It took a few days, but after the company agreed to form joint committees to monitor previous agreements, the blockade was lifted, while the community members agreed to start with dialogue before trying any blockades in the future.

Black also says that being near Barrick Gold’s (ABX-T, ABX-N) Lagunas Norte mine has made things easier for the company, since Barrick started off on the right foot when it arrived. He contrasted that with Newmont’s problems, which stem in part from having a poor operational record in the past.

“Here in Peru, if you make mistakes, especially on the social side, those mistakes stick with you for a long time,” Black says.

As to the Callyoma protest, Ganoza says locals blocked a main road intersection in a show of force that affected several mines in the area, while local media reported they were demanding more local infrastructure projects. The roads reopened within 48 hours, but the lack of infrastructure spending in the countryside makes such protests likely to happen again.

A recent Reuters investigation showed that Peru’s provincial governments are sitting on $3.5 billion in mining revenue gathered over the past decade, but lack the capacity to spend it.

Ganoza has seen this problem first-hand. He’s witnessed the country’s rapid growth in the past decade that has halved the poverty rate to 28%, but left many people not benefitting from the growth.

“We went from having a government without financial resources, to local governments having a large amount of financial resources available. So we need to catch up and learn to spend that money,” Ganoza says.

The problem, Ganoza says, is not the mining companies, mining legislation or system, but the need for better implementation of what’s already established.

“In Peru we have an excellent mining code that I think should be an example to many countries. It’s just the ability of the government to execute on existing laws . . . we just need the government to be more effective in its use and distribution of state resources,” Ganoza says.

Despite the challenges, both ­Black and Ganoza consider Peru one of the world’s top mining ­jurisdictions.

Ganoza says that Peru has not gotten any easier, but that it stands out as one of the best countries in Latin America.

“Where else are you going to go? In Chile, there is a shortage of power and water. Argentina today has become off limits for the industry basically, with all this nationalism. Brazil has always been challenging and it’s not getting any easier. Ecuador — well, we know all about Ecuador. There is a lot of excitement about Colombia but nothing has been permitted in Colombia yet. So it’s a paradise to go and explore, but how about turning those discoveries into mines?”

With their current projects up and running, Rio Alto and Fortuna  are on the hunt for their next mine. With both companies based in Peru, it is a natural starting point, but Black and Ganoza mention they are looking quite a bit at North America for their next asset as well.
We’ll see if either company decides to leap into another Peruvian challenge, or try its luck elsewhere.
© 1915 - 2012 The Northern Miner. All Rights Reserved.

 Se the Article online here:   Mid-tier producers grapple with Peru's growing pains | The Northern Miner - The Global Mining Newspaper

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RPT-#PDVSA turns to traders to sustain #Ecuador #oil deal | Reuters

And the $64,000 question, How much are the traders and their chavista friends making off these deals?

* Half of PDVSA's 2009-2011 shipments from 3rd countries

* Agreement aimed to eliminate reliance on intermediaries - supposedly...


RPT-PDVSA turns to traders to sustain Ecuador oil deal | Reuters

Mon Jun 25, 2012 9:00am EDT

By Marianna Parraga and Daniel Wallis

CARACAS, June 24 (Reuters) - Venezuelan state oil giant PDVSA has had to buy dozens of extra fuel cargoes from countries as far away as Estonia and Saudi Arabia to keep up its side of a 2008 oil supply deal with leftist ally Ecuador, according to traders and sales documents.

In an examination of shipping data that highlights the practical risks of political trade deals, Reuters found that half the fuel Venezuela sent to Ecuador, which cannot process its own heavy crude, came from third countries, often via trading companies including Glencore.

What was meant to be an example of cooperation between ideologically aligned states, with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez importing Ecuadorean crude in return for refined fuel, has instead become another sign of problems in PDVSA's refining network and a profitable niche for foreign traders.

It is also the latest indication of difficulties for PDVSA, one of the world's biggest oil companies and the cash cow of Chavez's "21st century" socialism. In an election year in Venezuela, PDVSA's finances are under growing pressure as Chavez digs deep into its coffers to fund welfare programs.

The shipments to Ecuador were corroborated by some traders involved in the deals - and show that the system appeared to stumble after its first year.

So Venezuela turned to third countries and traders, often derided by Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa as speculators, for many of the supplies. Sources said Venezuela paid the transport costs for bringing cargoes from countries that also included Britain, France, the Netherlands and Colombia.

"PDVSA has made deals but then doesn't have the agreed products, whether due to problems with refining, production or quality," said one trader involved in the transactions who asked for anonymity.

The bottlenecks in PDVSA's refineries - from accidents to outages and unplanned stops for maintenance - are well-known.

But the dynamics of the Ecuador deal underscore a less familiar truth: as Chavez inks ever-growing numbers of pacts with political allies, PDVSA has found itself in the improbable role of middleman. PDVSA officials did not immediately respond to a detailed request for comment.

Trading companies Glencore, Trafigura and PRSI Trading were hired by PDVSA to buy fuel for Ecuador on the open market, the details of the transactions showed.

Between 2009 and 2011, 53 percent of Venezuela's shipments to Ecuador were sourced from third countries, with traders accounting for 39 percent, according to a database of the shipments compiled by Reuters and Armando.info, a Caracas-based network of investigative journalists.

'ELIMINATE THIRD PARTIES'

The remaining 47 percent came from Venezuela and its overseas storage and refining facilities, according to the study. In total, shipments valued at $947 million were put in the hands of intermediaries during that 2009-11 period.

It was not clear how much traders made on the deals.

The agreement signed with much fanfare by Chavez and Correa four years ago s ays state oil company Petroecuador would supply Venezuela with Ecuadorean crude for processing by PDVSA refineries, and would receive fuel in return from Venezuela.

That way, the accord said, it will "eliminate intermediaries from direct participation in the buy-sell process."

Nevertheless, the Venezuelan government says it always planned for there to be scope in the agreement to vary where the crude was sent, and where the products for Ecuador were sourced.

"What we are doing is a triangulation," Venezuelan Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez said when asked by Reuters about the agreement, referring to the practice of receiving Ecuadorean crude then sourcing refined products from abroad.

"We receive their oil and we determine its value carefully. It is sold, and we get the products they need, of the quality they need, and it is sold to them."

The Ecuador deal is one of a host of oil deals that Chavez has signed with political allies - including China, Cuba and more than a dozen other nations in Central America and the Caribbean - many of which have been criticized by Venezuela's opposition before the Oct. 7 presidential election.

The opposition says Chavez rewards allies with crude on easy terms, including nations with questionable rights records such as Syria, Iran and Belarus. His government routinely dismisses such criticism as "counterrevolutionary" lies.

Chavez's government has also funded literacy programs, schools and health clinics in several leftist Latin American nations, winning him political influence in recent years and prompting some leaders to turn their backs on Washington and strengthen relations with China and Russia instead.

The oil agreements are a major factor putting pressure on PDVSA's increasingly constrained cash flow: in some cases, customers pay for shipments in exchange for goods and services.

The company also has to contend with falling global prices, and heavy local subsidies that mean Venezuelans enjoy the cheapest gasoline in the world.

RECORD REVENUE

To be sure, PDVSA still has a lot of financial clout. Its net profit jumped 42 percent to $4.5 billion last year on record revenue of almost $125 billion.

And it is still able to make huge contributions to Chavez's government - they doubled last year to nearly $50 billion - that help pay for his signature social programs, a central element of Chavez's re-election bid.

Companies including U.S. majors Chevron and Exxon Mobil Corp, Brazil's Petrobras and Petrochina also delivered cargoes to Ecuador on PDVSA's behalf under the deal, according to the bills for the shipments.

Individual traders confirmed the trend and various transactions involving their companies.

They said Venezuela's state oil company does the same thing to cover shortfalls in supply deals with other countries. Data on those agreements was not immediately available.

"PDVSA buys in the same way to supply Argentina, Uruguay and Bolivia," a trader told Reuters.

It would not be the first time Chavez's administration has worked with Western traders: Trafigura helped it beat a months-long, opposition-led strike that all but halted operations by PDVSA's own tankers during 2002 and 2003.

Part of the problem is that Ecuador produces heavy crude, like the majority of Venezuela's oil, meaning there is competition for access to Venezuelan refineries that process it.

That was cited by Venezuela's government in 2007 as one of the main reasons why the two nations had not signed a similar agreement earlier. But Ramirez later said it had been decided that PDVSA's U.S. refining subsidiary Citgo would handle some of the cargoes from Ecuador, with the rest going to Venezuela.

Sourcing fuel cargoes going the other way has proved expensive. For example, in June 2009 Trafigura chartered the Bright Express tanker to ship 263,500 barrels of catalytic naphtha, used for making gasoline, to Ecuador from Yanbu in Saudi Arabia. Maritimes sources say that journey alone will have cost PDVSA some $1.2 million.

"Trafigura was carrying a lot from Venezuela to Africa that year, so certainly it suited it to do the return journey bringing (products) from Yanbu," said a maritime source involved in PDVSA's shipping logistics.

"These are business opportunities that traders can't ignore."

REFINERY REVAMP

Asked by Reuters about the agreement, Petroecuador's general manager, Marco Calvopina, said it had always been expected that PDVSA might procure Ecuador's fuel from third countries.

"They handle big volumes of oil products. They can always find them on better terms than Petroecuador," Calvopina said.

"We have always compared the prices Venezuela offers us against the market ... sometimes we take them when it's convenient for the state, and on other occasions we have not."

Petroecuador has complained to PDVSA about the delayed arrival of some cargoes, and at times about the quality of the fuel delivered, the study of the shipping records showed.

Ecuador, OPEC's smallest member, currently pumps around 500,000 bpd of crude, just about a sixth as much as Venezuela.

As part of a big plan to revamp its fuel production and become an exporter within three years, Ecuador is investing $750 million to boost efficiency at its largest refinery, the 110,000 bpd Esmeraldas facility, and will invest an additional $600 million to enable it to make higher-quality products.

It says it also plans to spend $800 million overhauling its smaller Shushufindi refinery in the Amazon region.

At the center of the efforts is another project that also involves Venezuela: the construction of the 300,000 bpd, $12.5 billion Pacifico refinery, a PDVSA-Petroecuador joint venture slated to begin production in 2015. Ecuador says it is in talks with China about financing for it.

In April, Ramirez hailed Ecuador for "strengthening its capacity" to distance itself from market intermediaries who had undervalued its crude. A month later, Ecuador's foreign minister, Ricardo Patino, was in Caracas for talks with officials.

He said the two nations' collaboration should inspire similar pacts worldwide. "We are an example that can be turned into a form of global exchange," Patino said.

RPT-PDVSA turns to traders to sustain Ecuador oil deal | Reuters

June 25, 2012

#Guatemala introduces sweeping #mining law reforms - Mineweb.com

Guatemala introduces sweeping mining law reforms

Guatemala's Union of Extractive Industries says it will not support sweeping reforms to the nation's Mining Act, which include permanent royalty increases and the creation of a state mining company.

Author: Dorothy Kosich
Posted:  Monday , 25 Jun 2012
RENO (MINEWEB) - 

The Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) has introduced amendments to 30 articles of the country's Mining Act, one of which would require 147 companies with operating licenses to pay new royalty rates.

The amendments would also replace a voluntary agreement signed earlier this year between the mining industry and Guatemala's President Otto Perez Molina which increased the royalty rate on gross revenue by 400%. Gold and silver companies now voluntarily pay 4%, while base metals pay 3% and industrial minerals remained at 1%.

As a result the state is expected to reap royalties between Q600 million (US$76.38mn) to Q700 million (US$89.11mn) this year, up Q500 million (US$63.65mn) more than previously paid by Guatemala's mining industry.

The legislation also proposed the creation of a state mining company to possibly encourage government participation in Guatemala's mining and oil projects.

The MEM amendments would also establish a mining fund to distribute incomes from royalties including 35% to the community where the mine is located and 20% for the remaining communities in the department in which the mines operate.  Guatemala's Ministry of Social Development will get 20% of the royalties, the fund for national disaster emergencies 20%, and MEM and the Ministry of the Environmental and Natural Resources would receive 3% and 2%, respectively.

The legislation would also create a national system of mining information, as well as regulations for the reclamation of abandoned mines in Guatemala.

The MEM also proposes a crackdown on illegal mining in the country including the disposal of materials and chemicals in rivers.

A Mining Council, chaired by the Ministry of Energy and Mines, would be convened to develop a vision plan for mining both at the local and national levels. Council members would include the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources, the Ministry of Planning and Programming for the Presidency, a representative of the mining sector association, the Union of Extractive Industries (Gremiex), and a representative of the National Association of Municipalities.

However, Gremiex issued a statement, stating that the organization does not support the reform submitted by MEM because mining companies have not had a chance to review the contents of the legislation.

Gremiex said they were surprised that the MEM submitted reform measures to the Mining Act without reaching a consensus with mining and exploration companies.

Among the mining and exploration companies doing business in Guatemala are Goldcorp's Marlin operation and Radius Gold's El Tambor gold mine.

Read the article online here: Guatemala introduces sweeping mining law reforms - POLITICAL ECONOMY - Mineweb.com

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